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Abstract
We reformulate the Verhulst-Lotka-Volterra model of natural re-
source extraction under the alternative assumptions of Cournot be-
haviour and perfect competition, to revisit the tragedy of commons
vs the possibility of sustainable harvesting. We stress the di¤erent
impact of demand elasticity on the regulators possibility of driving
industry harvest to the maximum sustainable yield in the two settings.
The presence of a at demand function o¤ers the authority a fully ef-
fective regulatory tool in the form of the exogeneous price faced by
perfectly competitive rms, to drive their collective harvest rate at the
maximum sustainable yield. The same cannot happen under Cournot
competition, as in this case the price is endogenous and the regulators
policy is conned to limiting access to the common pool.
JEL Codes: C73, L13, Q20, Q28
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1 Introduction
Since Gordon (1954) and Hardin (1968), a leitmotiv of the discussion about
the tragedy of commons is our perception of the impact of market power
(or the lack thereof) on the preservation of renewable resources or natural
species. In a nutshell, considering free access and perfect competition as
equivalent, one is induced to think that the impact of perfect competition on
a renewable assets preservation is higher than the impact of any less-than-
perfectly competitive industry.
We revisit this issue using the logistic growth model of Verhulst (1838),
Lotka (1925) and Volterra (1931) (VLV henceforth), under both Cournot
behaviour and perfect competition. Due to the nonlinear dynamics char-
acterising the VLV model, it has been investigated in detail under perfect
competition (Pearce and Turner, 1989), while the current literature mod-
elling rmsstrategic behaviour in the tragedy of commons has adopted a
linear approximation of the original state equation describing the population
dynamics, to generate linear and nonlinear feedback solutions.1 This simpli-
ed version indeed calls for a feedback solution as the linearity of the state
dynamics implies that the open-loop solution is unstable (see, for instance,
Fujiwara, 2008; and Lambertini and Leitmann, 2013). Its drawback is that
abandoning the logistic growth curve for a linear state equation implies as-
suming a constant reproduction rate for the natural resource, and therefore
eliminates a fundamental element of the VLV model, namely, the maximum
sustainable yield, which is the peak of the concave growth rate, and the ideal
target of any public authority interested in a resource exploitation pattern
sustainable in the long run without compromising the survival of the stock.
In fact, the analysis in Pearce and Turner (1989) focusses on the conditions
under which monopoly (or a cartel) or perfect competition may harvest at
the maximum sustainable yield at any point in time.2
1Among the many contributions in this vein, see Benchekroun (2003, 2008); Fuji-
wara (2008); Colombo and Labrecciosa (2013a,b, 2015); Lambertini and Mantovani (2014,
2016); and Lambertini (2016).
2A related but not equivalent stream of literature discusses the possibile arising of
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Our approach is based on the strong time consistency of the open-loop
solution of the VLV model, irrespective of the nature or intensity of competi-
tion characterising the market. Under both Cournot and perfect competition,
the model produces two steady state equilibria which, in general, are located
symmetrically to the left and right of the maximum sustainable yield. In
both cases, that lying to the right is stable, while the other is not.
The main results of our analysis can be outlined as follows. If market
demand is downward sloping and rms behave à la Cournot, there exists a
subset of parameters in which the regulator may limit access to the common
pool so as to drive industry harvest as close as possible to the maximum
sustainable level, without reaching it. If instead perfect competition prevails
and demand is at, the total lack of rmscontrol on price o¤ers an addi-
tional tool to the policy maker who can regulate price to achieve the fully
sustainable harvest (i.e., the maximum sustainable yield) for any number of
rms in the industry. Hence, there emerges that what really matters is not
free vs regulated access to the commons, but rather the elasticity of demand:
an innitely elastic market demand o¤ers the possibility of regulating the
exogenously given price to attain the goal of sustainability.
The structure of the paper is the following. Section 2 describes the model
and Cournot behaviour. The perfectly competitive setting is in section 3.
Concluding remarks are in section 4.
2 Setup and Cournot competition
Consider a market existing over continuous time t 2 [0;1) ; being supplied
by n  1 identical rms exploiting a renewable resource X (t) to produce a
homogeneous nal good sold to consumers. The state dynamics is as in the
VLV model,

X (t) = X (t) [1  X (t)] Q (t) (1)
e¢ cient equilibria, possibly by means of cooperation among agents. Once again, e¢ ciency
does not in general imply the attainment of a harvest at the maximum sustainable yield.
See, e.g., Dockner and Kaitala (1993), Ehtamo and Hämäläinen (1993), and Martin-Herran
and Rincon-Zapatero (2005), among others.
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in which  and  are positive constants, and Q (t) =
Pn
i=1 qi (t) is the sum of
the n rmsindividual harvest at any instant. With an appropriate choice of
measure, qi (t) and Q (t) are also the instantaneous individual and industry
output levels. Note that, if  = 0; then (1) collapses to the linear state
dynamics used in the aforementioned literature, and is responsible of the
instability of the open-loop solution for any n.
Let the instantaneous demand and individual cost function be p (t) =
a Q (t) and Ci (t) = cq2i (t) ; respectively. As a result, rm is prot function
is i (t) = [p (t)  cqi (t)] qi (t). Firm i has choose harvest qi (t) so as to
maximise the discounted prot ow
i (t) =
Z 1
0
i (t) e
 tdt (2)
under the constraint posed by (1). The Hamiltonian function of rm i is
therefore
Hi (t) = [p (t)  cqi (t)] qi (t) + i (t) [X (t) (1  X (t)) Q (t)] (3)
to be maximised w.r.t. qi (t) ; the initial condition being X0 = X (0) > 0.
Suppose rms operate under open-loop information. The rst order con-
dition (FOC) taken w.r.t. qi is (henceforth, we omit the explicit indication
of the time argument):
@Hi
@qi
= a  2 (1 + c) qi +
X
j 6=i
qj   i = 0; (4)
and the costate equation is

i = [ (2X   1) + ]i (5)
This implies that the costate dynamics is described by a di¤erential equation
is separable variables, admitting the solution i = 0 at any time, for all
i = 1; 2; :::n. This fact, of course, means that prot-seeking rms do no
care about the preservation of the renewable resource stock. However, it also
implies that the open-loop solution of the game is indeed subgame perfect
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(or, strongly time consistent), although the structure of the game is not linear
in the state variable. Indeed, the game is state-redundant (see Dockner et
al., 2000).3
Imposing full symmetry across the population of rms and substituting
 = 0 in (4), the FOC delivers the static Cournot-Nash solution qCN =
a= (n+ 1 + 2c), which is invariant in the resource stock. Then, noting that

X R 0 for all X (1  X) R QCN = nqCN (6)
one can draw the relevant phase diagram in the state-control space, as illus-
trated in Figure 1. The horizontal arrows appearing along the at line at
QCN describe the dynamics of the stock implied by (6).
Figure 1 The phase diagram under Cournot competition
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The steady state levels of the stock are
XCN =
 (n+ 1 + 2c)p (n+ 1 + 2c) [ (n+ 1 + 2c)  4an]
2 (n+ 1 + 2c)
(7)
which belong to R+ for all  2 (0;  (n+ 1 + 2c) = (4an)]. The steady state
point
 
XCN  ; Q
CN

is unstable while the second,
 
XCN+ ; Q
CN

, is stable, as
one can see from Figure 1. Moreover, @XCN  =@n > 0 and @X
CN
+ =@n < 0:
3This property of the VLV model was originally pointed out by Goh et al. (1974). See
also Leitmann (1973).
5
More importantly, if  (n+ 1 + 2c)  4an = 0, the horizontal locus QCN
is tangent to the concave locus describing the undisturbed growth rate of the
natural resource. Should this happen (and it may do so in correspondence
of innitely many values of the parameter set f; ; a; c; ng), then industry
harvest would correspond to the maximum sustainable yieldMSY = 1= (2).
This would be an unstable case, as Figure 2 shows.
Figure 1 The phase diagram under Cournot competition
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However, note thatMSY = 1= (2) at nMSY =  (1 + 2c) = (4a  ) > 0
for all a > = (4) ; and
nMSY  1, a  (1 + c) 
2
(8)
with
(1 + c) 
2
>

4
(9)
Accordingly, we may formulate the following
Proposition 1 For all
a 2


4
;
(1 + c) 
2

;
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in correspondence of the lowest integer en > nMSY , the industry harvest is as
close as possible to the MSY and the resulting steady state is stable, with an
equilibrium stock equal to X+ (en).
Hence, the regulator may drive the industry harvest close to the MSY
by limiting access to the commons at en; which, if nMSY is an integer, will
be equal to nMSY + 1. The above proposition says that there exists an
intermediate range of values of the choke price a such that the maximum
sustainable yield is attained by an admissible industry structure (i.e., at least
in monopoly). It is worth noting that the same condition can be reformulated
by saying that nMSY  1 for all
 2

2a
1 + c
; 4a

(10)
or, in a range of values of the parameter which would measure the natural
growth rate of the resource in the linear approximation of the VLV model.
Before proceeding to the analysis of the impact of perfect competition, it
is worth observing that the Cournot oligopoly reproduces a perfectly com-
petitive industry in the limit, as n tends to innity under free entry, but does
so with a downward sloping demand function - which is not innitely elastic
- and an endogenous market price. These are typically not the assumptions
adopted to describe a perfectly competitive industry in which rms exert no
control whatsoever on price.
3 Perfect competition
Now we turn to the case in which the n rms are perfectly competitive and
behave as price-takers, which is the scenario examined in Pearce and Turner
(1989). The demand function is innitely elastic and the price p is exogenous
and time-invariant. Consequently, the instantaneous prot function of rm
i is i (t) = [p  cqi (t)] qi (t). The Hamiltonian function is dened as in (3),
but the presence of a constant market price modies the FOC taken w.r.t.
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individual harvest as follows:
@Hi
@qi
= p  2cqi   i = 0 (11)
The costate equation obviously coincides with (5), which again implies i = 0
at all times. As a result, the perfectly competitive individual harvest solving
(11) is qPC = p= (2c). This generates competitive equilibrium prots pc =
p2= (4c) at all times, independently of the number of rms, provided the
resource stock remains positive forever.
In steady state, the resource stock associated with qPC = p= (2c) is
Xpc =
p
cpc  2np
2
p
c
2 R+ 8  > 2np
c
(12)
The phase diagram is analogous to that portrayed in Figure 1. Moreover,
as under Cournot behaviour, the steady state characterised by Xpc+ is stable,
while the other is not, for the same reasons. And, once again, @Xpc  =@n > 0
and @Xpc+ =@n < 0:
Looking at (12), it is evident that Xpc = XMSY i¤ c   2np = 0.
This gives the regulator an additional degree of freedom, as the price can
be manoeuvred to drive Xpc+ arbitrarily close to the MSY , still preserving
the stability of the resulting steady state, for any number of rms. Indeed,
from the policy makers standpoint, the problem boils down to regulating np
(that is, either access to the common pool or price, or both) to minimise the
di¤erence between Xpc+ and XMSY . While in the Cournot setting the integer
problem must be explicitly accounted for, here the additional tool o¤ered by
the exogenous price opens the possibility of reaching any Xpc+ = XMSY + ",
with " positive and arbitrarily small.
The foregoing discussion can be summarised in the following:
Proposition 2 Under perfect competition, there exist innitely many pairs
(n; p) satisfying np = c= (2b) ; such that the industry harvest equals the MSY.
The joint assessment of Propositions 1-2 deserves some additional re-
marks. First, one has to consider that, under Cournot competition, the
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integer problem must explicitly be accounted for, while the presence of an
arbitrarily large number of rms in a perfectly competitive industry poses
no issue in view of the fact that the public authority can take n as given
and just regulate market price. Second, Proposition 1 identies a paramet-
ric restriction adding itself up to the integer problem, and it basically says
that, by regulating access to the common pool, the regulator may drive in-
dustry harvest close to the MSY without ever reaching it. This, of course,
holds as well in the special case in which the Cournot industry collapses to
a pure monopoly at n = 1. Put di¤erently, the integer problem causes the
Cournot-Nash industry harvest (even under regulated access) to exceed the
MSY strictly. This is not the case under perfect competition, as the integer
problem is no obstacle to the regulators action when the demand is perfectly
elastic.
This reveals a aw in our perception of the impact of competition (or,
conversely, of market power) on the resource stock in the long run, which
has long been debated, at least since the early analysis dating back to Pearce
and Turner (1989). The point is that free access and perfect competition
have been usually taken as synonymous in the literature on the economics of
common poolsexploitation, while they are not. Free access to the commons
implies that there is no upper limit to the number of rms extracting the
resource, other than their prot incentives. If we conceive perfect competition
as a scenario in which rms have no control on price and demand is at, then
it clearly appears that free access and perfect competition are not the same
thing. Indeed, free access may also characterise an oligopoly game whose
limit properties under free entry include marginal cost pricing, but this does
not apply to the equilibrium conguration of such an industry for any nite
number of rms. The foregoing analysis shows that the ultimate consequence
of the tragedy of commons, namely, resource exhaustion (or, the extinction
of the species) can be more easily avoided under perfect competition than in
any other less competitive situation in which some population of agents do
have a degree of market power and therefore endogenously determine market
price along a negatively sloped demand function.
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4 Concluding remarks
Our revisitation of the VLV model has shown that properly distinguishing
between free access to the commons and perfect competition o¤ers the pos-
sibility of identifying a policy based on price regulation inducing a perfectly
competitive industry to harvesting arbitrarily close to the MSY. The anal-
ogous approach to the same problem under Cournot competition has high-
lighted that the integer problem matters in a strategic oligopoly, preventing
the regulator to replicate the same outcome. This is due to the endogene-
ity of price when rms have market power, obliging the public authority to
explicitly regulate access to the commons.
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